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RAISING THE BAR 2 
Neonatal Transport Team Safety:  Raising the Bar  
 
 Current best medical practice recommends high-risk infants be delivered in perinatal 
centers with intensive care nurseries and neonatal specialists available to provide immediate 
resuscitation and stabilization.  Unfortunately, many high-risk infants are not delivered in 
perinatal centers because maternal factors restrict ability to transport.  In addition, neonatal 
problems are not always diagnosed before birth. Therefore, the need exists for specialized 
neonatal transport teams to quickly mobilize to the referring hospital, equipped with necessary 
supplies and equipment, in order to stabilize and care for the critically ill neonate.  
Description of the Problem 
 Neonatal transport teams combine the complexities associated with stabilization and 
management of a sick neonate with the dangers inherently associated with moving any patient 
from one location to another.  Transport team members are expected to provide state-of-the art 
neonatal care in an ever-changing, challenging environment. Changes in environmental 
temperatures and excess noise and vibration, combined with the extremely limited workspace 
inside of a medical helicopter, an ambulance, or fixed-wing aircraft, can interfere with the 
transport team’s ability to adequately assess the neonatal patient and intervene appropriately.  
This uncontrollable environment exposes the neonate to increased risks of adverse events, which 
may result in significant long-term injury or even death.   
One example of an adverse event related to the transport of premature infants is 
intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH). Transported premature infants have an increased incidence 
of IVH when compared to premature infants who are not transported (Mohamed, 2010).  
Transporting a fragile neonate involves extreme challenges that do not exist when transporting 
adults or even children.  Precision in every detail is paramount. The turn of a head or accidental  
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movement of an endotracheal tube by as much as a centimeter may, in some cases, be 
detrimental and may adversely affect the long- term physical and/or neurologic outcome. 
Neonatal transports are high-risk, low-volume health care events; therefore, neonatal transport 
teams should be carefully structured to minimize the inherent risks as much as possible. 
According to the 2007 American Academy of Pediatric Guidelines for Air and Ground 
Transport of Neonatal and Pediatric Patients, “The main goals of a neonatal-pediatric transport 
team are early stabilization and initiation of advanced care at the referring institution, with 
continuation of critical care therapies and monitoring en route, so as to improve safety of the 
transport and patient outcome.  The patient’s condition should not deteriorate owing to 
preventable issues during transport and, ideally, is improved by arrival at the receiving hospital” 
(Woodward, 2007, p. 1).   
 In order to gain an understanding of some of the patient safety concerns of neonatal 
transport teams, it is necessary to briefly review the history of healthcare safety.  Overall health 
care safety has been a significant concern in the United States since the early 1900’s.  In 1915, 
the American College of Surgeons allocated $500.00 to establish standards for quality patient 
care in hospitals as a result of a study demonstrating dismal outcomes for hospitalized patients.  
These Minimum Standards for Hospitals eventually led to voluntary accreditation for hospitals 
by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), chartered in 
1951 (Woodward, 2007, p. 303). Accreditation by JCAHO is voluntary and most facilities that 
are surveyed receive accreditation (~99%).  JCAHO does not view accreditation as a public 
regulatory program. Instead, JCAHO identifies itself as a consultant, paid by and responsible to 
the medical care industry. It acts as a quality control consultant to the hospitals it inspects. 
Despite the fact that JCAHO considers itself a private consultant, it plays a major role in  
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government regulatory programs.  Although accreditation is in theory voluntary, hospital  
accreditation is a requirement for participation in many private or public licensing, certification 
and financing programs. For example, the federal government relies heavily upon JCAHO 
accreditation for certifying health care facilities for participation in the Medicare program (Jost, 
1983). 
 Neonatal transport medicine is not included in JCAHO accreditation programs.  According 
to a 2003 Air Medical Journal Associates article, JCAHO was approached in 1998 regarding the 
possibility of including air medical transport in their accreditation process.  At that time, JCAHO 
felt they did not have the background or the experience to develop standards related to aviation 
and therefore were not interested in developing a JCAHO process for any medical transport 
program within the United States.  Interestingly, JCAHO has operated an international medical 
transport-accrediting program for hospitals since 1999 and in 2003 the first edition of the Joint 
Commission International Accreditation Standards for Medical Transport Organizations was 
published (Frazer, 2003).  
 Two significant issues that contribute to the safety concerns of air medical services are the 
Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978 and the change in Medicare reimbursement for air 
ambulance services that occurred in 2002.  The ADA was enacted for the specific purpose of 
removing government control over fares, routes and market entry for new airlines in the 
commercial aviation industry. Unfortunately, an unintended consequence of the ADA was the 
specific prohibition of states’ ability to oversee certain aspects of air ambulance services (ACCT, 
2011). In addition, unlike other areas of medicine, Medicare does not currently differentiate air 
ambulances based on quality, capability, or patient safety.  Medicare reimbursement of air  
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ambulances changed in 2002. The change improved Medicare reimbursement to compensate for 
the high fixed cost of meeting the highest quality and patient safety for patients requiring air  
ambulance transport. However, Medicare does not require adherence to those higher standards, 
and pays the exact same base rates to all air ambulance providers.  This has produced significant 
differences in medical capability, patient safety and quality.  For those voluntarily meeting the 
highest capabilities, the Medicare fee schedule barely covers their costs; for others it can be 
financially lucrative. The Medicare fee schedule has led to an expansion of more than double the 
number of medical helicopters since 2002.  While the growth has potentially expanded access in 
some areas, the growth has also occurred where medical helicopters were already in abundance.  
Unfortunately, the ADA prevents states’ ability to oversee air ambulance availability, ensure 
statewide availability of medical helicopters while preventing duplication of services. Since the 
2002 Medicare fee schedule adjustment, available air ambulance growth has increased 434%, 
dedicated air medical helicopter operators have increased 88% but the number of patients 
transported by air ambulance has only increased 33% (GAO Report, 2010). 
 With the exception of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which provides safety 
regulations for the aviation aspect of medical transports, no other state or federal regulations 
exist to provide structure or oversight for medical transport programs (Frazer, 2010).  Those 
within the medical transport profession recognized the need for improved standardization and 
regulations related to the transport of patients. The Commission on Accreditation of Air Medical 
Services (CAAMS) was organized in 1990, in response to the unacceptably large number of air-
medical crashes and deaths in the 1980’s.  Specific standards were developed at that time that 
addressed safety and patient care issues that formed the foundation for CAAMS accreditation.  In 
1997 CAAMS expanded to meet the needs of ground critical care transport services and led to  
RAISING THE BAR 6 
 
the name change to Commission on Accreditation of Medical Transport Systems (CAMTS).  
CAMTS currently sets general national safety and patient care standards for all modes of  
transport.  
 CAMTS accreditation is voluntary and indicates a commitment to quality patient care and 
a safe environment for transport team personnel. Reimbursement is not structured to 
acknowledge CAMTS accreditation. As of October 2010, 156 medical transport programs were 
CAMTS certified (CAMTS, 2011).  
  Medical transport teams are either hospital based or community based programs. Hospital 
based teams are usually operated by the hospital system and transport team members are hospital 
employees.  Hospital-based teams tend to support dedicated transport teams with full time 
specialty medical personnel (neonatal and pediatric specialists) available to transport high-risk 
neonates or high-risk pediatric patients. As a general rule, these team members train together and 
work together on a regular basis.  The regularity with which they work together affords them the 
opportunity to mature as a team and achieve and maintain a level of competency required for 
safe neonatal transports.   
 Community-based transport companies provide transport services within a particular 
geographical region and transport patients for several different hospitals, as well as providing 
pre-hospital emergency services. Community-based transport programs utilize a combination of 
emergency medical technicians, paramedics and registered nurses, certified in advanced cardiac 
life support (ACLS) and advanced trauma life support (ATLS).  These programs are adult-
oriented with limited ability to independently and safely transport neonatal patients. When 
community-based transport programs are utilized for neonatal transports, neonatal specialists 
from the receiving hospital frequently augment the transport team.  These specialty team  
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members include two or three neonatal specialists (neonatal fellows, neonatal nurse practitioners, 
neonatal registered nurses, or neonatal-trained respiratory therapists). These specialty teams are  
considered non-dedicated teams in that they do not work together in the transport environment 
on a regular basis. The ad-hoc nature of this team configuration challenges the specialty team 
members to function safely and effectively within the “part-time” neonatal transport team model.   
       Literature Review 
 The literature was searched for information about neonatal transport teams, team training 
strategies, team performance, and aviation training concepts related to medicine.  An electronic 
search of CINAHL, and MEDLINE databases was performed using keywords and key phrases 
health care teams, team training, team performance, crew resource management, human error in 
health care, neonatal transports, and health care safety.  With the exception of the 1999 landmark 
report from the Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human:  Building A Safer Health System, only 
literature published within that past 10 years was included. In addition, relevant references cited 
in reviewed articles were retrieved.  
The 1999 Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) landmark report To Err is Human:  Building a 
Safer Health System concluded that up to 98,000 patient deaths occurred annually from 
preventable, care-related errors.  According to the report, preventable medical errors in hospitals 
exceed death rates of motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, and AIDS. In addition to the cost to 
human life, preventable medical errors result in total cost of between $17 billion and $29 billion 
per year in hospitals nationwide (including the expense of additional care required as a result of 
the errors, lost income and household productivity, and disability).  Medial errors also damage 
societal trust in the health care system (Kohn, et al, 2000). 
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 The IOM report defines “safety as freedom from accidental injury.  Error is defined as the 
failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an  
aim” (Kohn, et al, 2000, p. 4). The IOM report blames the decentralized and fragmented nature 
of the healthcare delivery system for contributing to unsafe conditions for patients. The goal of 
the IOM report was to break the cycle of inaction.  The report suggested a comprehensive 
approach to improving patient safety (Kohn, et al, 2000).  
 In the IOM’s report the committee presented a comprehensive strategy, by which 
government, health care providers, industry, and consumers could reduce preventable medical 
errors.  The IOM recommended “a four-tired approach: 
1. Establishing a national focus to create leadership, research, tools and 
protocols to enhance the knowledge base about safety; 
 
2. Identifying and learning from errors through immediate and strong 
mandatory reporting efforts…[and encouraging]….voluntary efforts, both 
with the aim of making sure the system continues to be made safer for 
patients; 
 
3. Raising standards and expectations for improvements in safety through the 
actions of oversight organizations, group purchasers, and professional 
groups; and 
 
4. Creating safety systems inside [healthcare] organizations through the 
implementation of safe practices at the delivery level.  This level is the 
ultimate target of all the recommendations” (Kohn et al., 2000, p.6). 
   
The IOM noted that the majority of medical errors result from system failures, rather than 
from individual providers’ substandard performance.  Therefore, the IOM recommended 
establishing interdisciplinary team-training programs. The IOM’ s stated goal was to reduce the 
rate of medical errors by 50 percent over a five-year period (Kohn, et al, 2000). 
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A follow-up article was published in 2004, titled Five Years After To Err Is Human:  
What have we learned? Written by Drs. Lucian Leape and Donald Berwick and published by the 
Journal of the American Medical Association, the article presents a harsh assessment of the  
health care system’s performance five years after the original IOM report was published. All 
hospitals implemented new practices to improve safety.  But in spite of the fact that newly- 
implemented safety efforts appeared to improve safety in very specific situations, their overall 
impact was difficult to see in national statistics because no comprehensive nationwide 
monitoring system had been established and implemented (Leape, 2005). 
According to the article, although patient safety improvements were difficult to identify, the 
impact on attitudes within health care organizations was profound.  Healthcare leaders learned a 
great deal about safety during those five years.  The effects of the IOM report were evident in 
three areas:  viewing the task of error prevention, enlisting the support of stakeholders, and 
changing practices. In the mid 1990’s almost no one was talking about patient safety.  In 1999, 
prior to the IOM report, a few hospitals were developing a strong commitment to patient safety.  
By 2005, most health care institutions were involved in patient safety improvements to some 
extent and public awareness was at an all-time high. However, in spite of the increased focus on 
patient safety initiatives health care was not measurably safer.  The article blames three aspects 
of the culture of medicine for the lack of improvements:  1) the culture of medicine is deeply 
rooted, both by custom and by training, in high standards of autonomous individual performance, 
as opposed to team performance, 2) the vast complexity of the health care system in terms of 
relationships and the large number of specialists, subspecialists, and allied professionals 
interacting with each other and, 3) apathy toward attempts by others outside the profession to 
improve practice and skepticism of the concept that systems failures are the underlying cause of  
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most human errors.  In addition, a fear of malpractice liability inhibits willingness to discuss, or 
even admit errors. Creating cultures of safety requires major changes in behavior, changes that 
professionals easily perceive as threats to their authority and autonomy. (Leape, 2005). 
According to the article, “neither strong evidence of ongoing serious harm nor the activities, 
examples, and progress of a courageous minority are sufficient to generate the national 
commitment needed to rapidly advance patient safety.  Such a commitment is not likely to be 
forthcoming without more sustained and powerful pressure on the hospital boards and leaders—
pressure that must come from outside the health industry” (Leape, 2005, p. 2389). 
The article also suggests safety efforts must be aligned behind common national safety goals 
that are strict, ambitious, quantitative and well tracked.  According to the article, “The most 
important lesson of the past 5 years since the IOM spoke out on one of the major public health 
issues of our time is that we will not become safe until we choose to become safe (Leape, 2005, 
p. 2390).   
 Effectiveness of team training was demonstrated in two meta-analyses conducted by Salas.  
et al (2007) (2008).  In the first study, Testing Three Team Training Strategies in Intact Teams:  
A Meta-Analysis, Salas et al, examined three specific team-training strategies used by intact 
teams:  
1) “Team Coordination and Adaptation Training: refers to a team training intervention in 
which team members are trained to alter their coordination strategy and to reduce the 
amount of communication necessary for successful task performance.  Team 
coordination and adaptation training are assumed to help team members learn about 
specific teamwork skills and how to optimize the value of idle periods when task 
demands are low by anticipating and discussing potential problems. 
 
2) Guided Team Self-Correction Training: refers to a team training intervention in which 
team members learn to diagnose the team’s problems and to develop effective 
solutions. Guided team self-correction training is assumed to foster correct  
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expectations (i.e., shared mental models) among team members, thereby contributing 
to more effective team performance). 
 
3) Cross Training: refers to a team training intervention in which team members rotate 
positions during training to develop an understanding of the knowledge and skills 
necessary to successfully perform the tasks of other team members.  Cross training is 
assumed to give team members an overall framework for understanding the team’s task 
and how each individual’s role is important to it” (Salas, et al., 2007, p. 474-475).   
 
 Their results indicated that overall team training strategies did improve team performance. 
The analysis indicated that Team Coordination and Adaptation Training, a form of team training 
similar to Crew Resource Management (CRM) training, accounted for 37% of the variance in 
team performance.  Similarly, Guided Team Self-Correction training accounted for 20% of the 
variance in team performance.  Cross training, the third strategy examined, did not result in an 
effect on performance.  However, according to Salas, et al, more recent work has re-examined 
the effect of cross training and has found that it accounts for 15% of the variance in performance.  
 In  2008 Salas and colleagues published another meta-analysis, Does Team Training 
Improve Team Performance?  This meta-analysis focused on both task work and teamwork.  It 
treated each form of team training as equivalent and treated all targeted outcomes of team 
training interventions as interchangeable.  Their findings indicated that overall team training had 
a positive effect on team functioning (p = 0.34).  The relative effectiveness of specific 
interventions on team cognitive, affective, process, and performance outcomes was assessed. 
Training content, team membership stability, and team size were investigated as potential  
moderators of the relationship between team training and outcomes.  The database consisted of 
93 effect sizes representing 2,650 teams.  The results suggested positive relationships exist 
between team training interventions and each of the outcome types. Their findings suggest team-
training interventions are a viable approach organizations can take in order to enhance team 
outcomes (Salas, 2008).  
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 The final database for the research consisted of a total of 93 correlations obtained from 45 
primary studies, representing 2,650 teams (1,660 teams were teams from the lab or classroom 
setting, 762 teams were from the military sector, 138 teams were aviation teams, 80 teams were 
medical teams, and 10 teams were from business organizations).  Of the 45 studies included in 
the meta-analytic database, 31 were published and 14 were unpublished.  The meta-analytic 
results for the four primary areas of investigation (cognitive, affective, process, performance)  
were reported.  Key pieces of information from each analysis includes the number of teams in 
each analysis (N), the number of independent effect sizes (correlations) in each analysis (k), the 
mean weighted observed correlation (r), and the 80% confidence interval for that correlation.  In 
addition, the tables display the estimated true score correlation (p), the standard deviation of this 
true score correlation (SDp), the 80% credibility interval (10% CV and 90% CV), and the 
percentage of variance accounted for by statistical artifacts (Salas, 2008).  
 The overall results support the authors’ hypothesis that team training does work.  Team 
training was shown to have a moderate, positive effect on team functioning (p = 0.34; 10% CV= 
0.34; 90% CV = 0.34).  The results revealed team training to have a positive effect on each of the 
four outcomes under investigation (cognitive, affective, teamwork processes, and performance).  
The findings suggest team-training interventions are a viable approach for organizations to take 
in order to enhance team performance and outcomes.  In the study, team training accounted  
for approximately 12% to 19% of the variance in the examined outcomes. The research also 
showed membership stability moderated the relationship between team training and team 
outcomes, such that intact teams that underwent training improved the most on process and 
performance outcomes.  The authors suggest intact teams have already overcome some of the  
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maturational challenges that newly formed teams would not have had the opportunity to navigate 
(Salas, 2008).  
 In a 2003 report titled Medical Teamwork and Patient Safety:  The Evidence-Based 
Relation prepared for the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) by Baker, et al, 
empirical evidence concerning the relationship between teamwork and patient safety was 
reviewed.  The evidence suggests training teams of health care providers constitutes a practical, 
effective strategy for enhancing patient safety by reducing medical errors.  This report applies 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) research to the field of medicine.  It also provides a 
comprehensive review and evaluates the effectiveness of current medical team-training 
initiatives.  The report focused on research conducted in other, parallel, high-stress, high-risk 
environments such as the military and commercial aviation where the consequences of error are 
extreme.  According to the report, the definition of “team” includes the following five 
characteristics: 
 
1. Teams consist of a minimum of two or more individuals. 
 
2. Team members are assigned specific roles, perform specific tasks, and interact or 
coordinate to achieve a common goal or outcome. 
 
3. Teams make decisions. 
 
4. Teams have specialized knowledge and skills and often work under conditions of 
high workload. 
 
5. Teams differ from small groups because teams embody the coordination that 
results from task interdependency; that is, teamwork characteristically requires 
team members to adjust to one another, either sequentially or simultaneously, to 
achieve team goals (Baker, et al, 2003). 
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 Examples of teams that fit this definition include military command-and-control teams, 
cockpit crews, SWAT teams and fire rescue teams.  This definition also fits healthcare teams, 
such as medical emergency teams, intensive care units, operating room teams, and neonatal 
transport teams, to name a few.  
 “The AHRQ review concluded that: 
1. The medical field lacks a theoretical model of team performance. 
 
2. The science of team performance and training can help the medical community 
improve patient safety.  
 
3. Research has already identified many of the competencies that are necessary for 
effective teamwork in medical environments.  
 
4. A number of proven instructional strategies are available for promoting effective 
teamwork.  
 
5. Team-training strategies must be further adapted to suit medical needs.  
 
6. The medical community has made considerable progress in designing and 
implementing team training across a number of settings. 
 
7. The impact of medical CRM training on patient safety outcomes has not been 
addressed. 
 
8.  The institutionalization of medical team training across different medical setting 
has not been addressed” (Baker, et al, 2003, p. 42-46). 
 
 According to the article, the delivery of recurrent team training across the healthcare 
community is generally haphazard.  Few mechanisms exist to ensure that it occurs on a regular 
basis.  Few system-wide procedures exist for reporting errors, and few organizational policies 
allow and encourage providers to report near misses, without incurring sanctions.  As a result, 
the health care system often fails to regard medical teamwork as an important component of 
medical performance.  One way to correct this systemic indifference is to institute a formal,  
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mandatory error-reporting system.  Another strategy would be to require that providers 
participate at specified intervals in team-training programs (Baker, et al, 2003). 
 The authors identify the following five research needs: 
 
1. Develop a theoretical model of medical-team performance. 
 
2. Focus more attention on measuring teamwork processes and outcomes as they 
relate to medicine. 
 
3. Evaluate medical-team training more effectively. 
 
4. Focus on diagnosing team performance. 
 
5. Determine the role of simulation-based training (Baker, et al, 2003). 
 
 The authors acknowledge the significant expense of team training and pose the following 
two questions, “What constitutes the optimal trade-off between training effectiveness and cost 
effectiveness?” and “ To what degree must an effective simulation reflect physical versus 
psychological fidelity?”  (Baker, et al, 2003, p. 51).  Based on previous simulation-training 
research, the authors assume the more realistic the training scenario, the more effective the 
training.  Essentially, health care teams must function as teams during training.   
 Briget Cross and Diana Wilson, in their 2009 article, High-Fidelity Simulation for 
Transport Team Training and Competency Evaluation, discuss challenges facing training and 
competency evaluation of transport team members and discuss incorporation of high-fidelity 
simulation into their neonatal transport team education programs (Cross, 2009, p. 202).  In 2004 
JCAHO published a Sentinel Event Alert, evaluating 109 perinatal cases, 93 resulting in death 
and 16 resulting in major permanent disability.  Root cause analysis of 47 of the cases found 
72% had issues with communication involving hierarchy and intimidation, failure to function as  
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a team, and failure to follow the proper chain of communication; 47% had issues with staff 
competence; and 40% had issues related to the lack of orientation and appropriate training.   
 The authors discuss the fact that simulation-based training has already been adopted as the 
standard in many highly technical, complex, and dynamic professions.  They also explain many 
national and international health organizations recommend simulation-based medical training.  
The authors suggested that national standards for neonatal transport team education and 
certification are needed to promote the highest level of care for critically ill neonates and 
effectively reduce morbidities and mortality in the neonatal patient population.   
 Mohamed and Aly, in their 2010 article, Transport of premature infants is associated with 
increased risk for intraventricular hemorrhage, examined the correlation between inter-hospital 
transports and the incidence and severity of intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH) in VLBW infants. 
According to the article, IVH significantly impacts long-term outcomes of very low birth weight 
VLBW infants. IVH’s are categorized as Grade I through Grade IV. Grade I is a germinal matrix 
hemorrhage, is limited to the subependymal area, and does not involve the ventricles.  A  
Grade II IVH occurs within the ventricles but does not cause ventricular distention.  A Grade III 
IVH is severe enough to cause ventricular distention and a Grade IV IVH involves the ventricles  
and parenchyma. The article defines severe IVH as grade III-IV and non-severe IVH as grades I-
II (Mohamed, 2010).  
 “ Almost 60% of severe IVH survivors may develop cerebral palsy, and about 70% will be 
mentally retarded” (Mohamed, 2010, p. F406).   Even though infants with non- severe IVH are 
not a high risk for severe handicaps, they have lower test scores on the Mental Developmental 
Index or when their visual-motor integration was assessed.  The incidence of IVH in VLBW 
infants significantly decreased over the past few decades from 40-50% in 1980’s to  
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approximately 20% in 1990. Unfortunately, the incidence of IVH has not improved since 1990.  
In fact, a significant trend for increased IVH nationwide has emerged since 2003-2004.  Such an 
increase in IVH is associated with a noticeable increase in the use of neonatal transports 
(Mohamed, 2010). 
 The datasets produced by the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) from the 
AHRQ was utilized for the study.  These datasets come from a database collected annually from 
the hospitalization records of inpatient admissions from more than 1000 hospitals across the 
United States.  HCUP produced the National Inpatient Sample Database (NIS) and its pediatric 
version (KID).  NIS data represent a 10% sample of all hospital admissions during any given 
years for patients of all ages.  KID dataset has similar data elements but only includes pediatric 
patients.  KID dataset is available for the years 1997, 2000 and 2003 and was included in the 
study.  The NIS dataset for the years 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2004 were also included in the 
study. Infants < 1500 grams were included and were classified into either inborn or transport  
groups.  Groups were further delineated according to birth weights of < 1000 grams and 1000-
1499 grams.  IVH and severe IVH (grades 3-4) were compared between groups and subgroups.  
Infants with missing data for transport status or birth weight were excluded from the study.   
Infants transported after the first 48 hours were also excluded as intraventricular hemorrhages 
occurring after 48 hours of age are generally considered as independent of transport.  Infants 
with central nervous system anomalies, congenital heart disease (except patent ductus 
arteriosus), congenital lung anomalies, congenital abdominal wall defects, multiple congenital 
anomalies and chromosomal disorders were excluded as they can directly attribute to the 
occurrence of IVH or affect the outcome of the preterm infants (Mohamed, 2010).  
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SAS V.8.2 was used to conduct all statistical analyses.  X2 and Fisher exact tests were 
used to calculate odds ratios (OR) for IVH and severe IVH in the transport group compared to 
the inborn.  Logistic regression models were used to calculate adjusted OR for IVH or severe 
IVH in transport group compared to the inborn, controlling for several demographic and clinical 
confounders.  Confounding variables included sex, race, extremely low birth weight (ELBW < 
1000 grams), birth asphyxia, fetal academia, apnea of prematurity, respiratory distress syndrome 
(RDS), persistent pulmonary hypertension of the newborn, pneumothorax, pulmonary 
hemorrhage, PDA, sepsis, necrotizing enterocolitis, maternal hypertension, maternal infection or 
chorioamnionitis, antepartum hemorrhage, cord prolapse, or nuchal cord, breech presentation, 
and instrumented delivery.  IVH grades three and four were considered to be severe IVH.  X2 
Test was used to detect significant trends in the frequency of inter-hospital transport or the 
incidence of IVH over the years of the study (Mohamed, 2010). 
A total of 67,596 infants < 1500 grams met the inclusion and exclusion criteria.  9.2% 
were transported between hospitals during the first 48 hours of life.  The overall incidence of  
IVH was 14.7%, the overall mortality was 24.5% and 46% of the babies were < 1000 grams at 
birth.  There was no difference between the transport and inborn groups with regards to sex or  
Caucasian race.  The transport group had fewer African Americans, more Hispanics, more 
ELBW infants and more RDS.  
The transport group had more IVH compared to the inborn group (27.4% vs. 13.42%); 
adjusted OR 1.75 (95% CI 1.64 to 1.86, p <0.001).  Of the VLBW infants who had IVH, 41.9% 
had the diagnostic code of IVH.  The diagnosis of severe IVH (grades 3-4) was found in 35.3% 
of these cases.  Severe IVH was higher in the transport when compared to the inborn group 
(44.1% vs. 32.9% respectively); adjusted OR 1.44 (95% CI 1.22 to 1.70, p<0.001).  
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For infants <1000 grams, the overall IVH and severe IVH were increased in the transport 
compared to inborn group; adjusted OR 1.91 (95% CI 1.76 to 2.08, p<0.001) and 1.36 (95% CI 
1.12 to 1.66, p = 0.002), respectively.  For infants 1000-1499 grams, IVH and severe IVH were 
higher in transport group as well; adjusted OR 1.47 (95% CI 1.33 to 1.63, p<0.001) and 1.60 
(95% CI 1.18 to 2.18, p = 0.003), respectively.  
The study demonstrated an increase in both the overall incidence of IVH as well as 
severe IVH in VLBW infants who are transported to a tertiary center for care vs. infants who are 
born at the tertiary center.  The correlation between IVH and transport remained high after 
controlling for confounding factors that are known to increase the risk for IVH. 
Almost all IVH (98%) occur in the first week of life, the majority of them within the first 
48 hours after birth.  Low-grade IVH may progress into high grade IVH in the first one or two 
days after the initial bleed.  In this study, only infants transferred within the first 48 hours of life 
were included to capture only those who might develop IVH in correlation with the transport 
process.  Possible explanations for increased incidence of IVH of transported infants include:   
1) vigorous manipulations, 2) kinking or obstruction of the endotracheal tube, and 3) self-
extubation or iatrogenic trauma while moving the infant. While the overall incidence of IVH 
decreased from 40-50% in the 1980’s to ~ 20% in the 1990’s, there is an alarming trend of an  
increased incidence in IVH since 2003.  Such an increase is associated with a noticeable increase 
in the use of neonatal transports. The clinical implications of the study are to encourage more 
regionalization of care and to continue to encourage the transport of high-risk mothers to tertiary 
care centers.  According to the article, regionalization of care has been shown to significantly 
improve neonatal outcomes (Mohamed, 2010).  
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IMPACT ON FAMILIES 
 When an infant requires transport to an intensive care nursery, parents are unprepared for 
the crisis that inevitably follows. The referring physician makes the decision to transfer the 
infant, frequently with little or no parental input. Parents and family members are instantly 
plunged into both an emotional, as well as a potential financial crisis. In an instant, their life 
changes. They experience fear over their infant’s health and safety, fear of separating from 
family to accompany their infant to another city or state, fear of having adequate financial 
resources to live away from home for an indefinite period of time, and fear of isolation as they 
are removed from family, friends, and community. Parents of transported infants need 
information and support. 
  In a 2002 article by Steeper, when parents were interviewed about the transport of their 
critically ill infant, they described it as a negative experience. When an infant is born with a life-
threatening condition, parents are expected to cope with the overwhelming information regarding 
their infant’s illness and, simultaneously, they must adjust to the news that their infant will be 
transported to another city or state. When asked about specifics of the transport experience, 
parents stressed the overwhelming nature of the experience.  They expressed concern related to 
too much information being presented at a time when they were emotionally unable to process 
and understand most of what was being presented. Parents requested information be streamlined 
and limited to only the most important information.  
 The infant’s differential diagnosis should be discussed with the parents as well as 
information about treatment and prognosis of each of the differential diagnoses.  In addition, any 
anticipated procedures should be explained.  All anticipated care of the infant prior to transport, 
during transport, and upon arrival at the receiving hospital, should be carefully explained to the 
parents as well.  The parents should be encouraged to ask questions prior to transport.   
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 Parents expressed a desire to receive a pamphlet with information about the NICU, 
including the phone number. Other information parents deemed as “important” included 
directions to the referral hospital, parking information, and hotel/restaurant options. Parents also 
expressed the value of having their infant brought to mom’s room prior to transport in order for 
them to see, touch and get pictures. Mothers also stressed the importance of receiving 
information about pumping/storing breast milk (Steeper, 2002). 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A neonatal transport program must be tailored to the specific needs of the neonatal 
population and only qualified personnel with appropriate training and equipment should perform 
inter-facility transport of neonatal patients.  A neonatal transport program should be designed 
and developed with a clear mission of safety and expert neonatal care as the ultimate priority.  
Attention should be focused on transport team design, selection of individual transport team 
members, team training techniques, program quality initiatives and data collection and analysis. 
Only health care institutions prepared to support a safe, expert neonatal transport team should 
consider offering neonatal transport services to its referral base. If hospital administrators 
conclude the cost of a dedicated, professional neonatal transport team is prohibitive, they should 
consider contracting neonatal transport services to a proven neonatal transport team provider on 
a fee-for-service basis.  
TRANSPORT TEAM DESIGN 
“Every system is perfectly designed to achieve exactly the results it achieves” (author 
unknown).  The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), in its 2007 Guidelines for Air and 
Ground Transport of Neonatal and Pediatric Patients, provides information, education, and  
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guidelines for health care professionals who provide and/or supervise inter-facility transport of 
children and neonates.  Even though the AAP does not provide any regulatory oversight to the 
neonatal transport community, it does offer neonatal-specific transport guidelines. According to 
the AAP guidelines, most large transport services have certain organizational features in 
common.  The most important feature is a dedicated team of health care professionals proficient 
at providing neonatal critical care during transport. The AAP guidelines also emphasize the need 
for a sufficient number of neonatal transports to enable team members to maintain their skills 
and to permit staff to be optimally utilized.  “Other key components include the following:  1) 
online (real-time) medical control by qualified medical physicians, 2) ground and/or air 
ambulance capabilities, 3) communications and dispatch capability, 4) prospectively written 
clinical and operational guidelines, 5) a comprehensive database allowing for quality and 
performance improvements activities, and 6) medical and nursing direction, 7) administrative 
resources, and 8) institutional endorsement and support” (Woodward, 2007, p. 2-3).  
“Construction of a well-functioning transport program begins with building a strong 
foundation, including personnel, training, equipment, communication, and vehicles (ambulance, 
helicopter, or fixed-wing aircraft).  How each of these cornerstones is designed and structured 
determines the caliber of service.  Continual monitoring and evaluation of the transport program 
are critical to providing quality patient care and ensuring that the program can stand the test of 
time” (Woodward, 2007, p. 133). 
TRANSPORT TEAM MEMBER SELECTION 
 Providing neonatal critical care during a transport is significantly different from 
providing care in a neonatal intensive care unit.  A neonatal provider, competent within the  
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confines of the intensive care nursery, may or may not be able to provide competent, safe 
neonatal care in the patient compartment of an ambulance or helicopter, or in an unfamiliar 
hospital’s NICU or obstetrical operating room.  A neonatal transport team member’s professional 
degree is less important than his/her ability to provide the level of neonatal care required in a 
mobile environment (Woodward, 2007).   
Neonatal transport team candidates should be willing participants who choose to apply 
for a position on the transport team, as opposed to being assigned to the team. Neonatal transport 
team candidates should possess neonatal experience and expertise. In addition, they should 
possess a keen ability to troubleshoot and solve problems quickly and creatively. Neonatal 
transport team candidates should also possess excellent interpersonal and communication skills. 
Reluctant neonatal transport team members are suboptimal candidates and should never be 
utilized for such critical medical missions. 
TEAM TRAINING  
“Teamwork is a set of interrelated behaviors, cognitions, and attitudes.  It is more than 
knowledge and skills.  Teamwork depends on the ability of each team member to 1) anticipate 
the needs of others, 2) adjust to each other’s actions and to the changing environment, and 3)  
have shared understanding of how a procedure should happen in order to identify when errors are 
occurring and how to correct for these errors” (Salas, 2003, p. 7).   
 Health care education focuses on individual knowledge, competence, and technical 
expertise as opposed to teamwork proficiency.  Individual health care professionals are expected 
to function regularly as a member of a health care team, yet most do not ever train together as 
teams. The current expectation is that a group of healthcare experts is the same as an expert  
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health care team. This is a “flawed” principle with dangerous implications for all healthcare 
recipients. According to Baker, et al, system failures cause far more errors than poor individual 
performance (Baker, 2003). 
 Suboptimal medical care of a neonatal patient may result in long-term neurologic, as well 
as physical disabilities or even death.  The safety bar must be set at the highest possible level 
related to the transport of this fragile patient population. Information learned from the team 
training literature should be applied to neonatal transport team-training programs. Aviation 
standards and Crew Resource Management principles should also be applied. Errors and even 
near misses should be considered unacceptable under any circumstances and transport team 
training should incorporate performance expectations/strategies that reflect a zero tolerance for 
error.  
  The transport curriculum should include didactic and practical instruction in the clinical 
and operational aspects of transport medicine. The transport-training course should be robust and 
challenging, as should the post-training evaluation process.  A written exam and a simulation- 
style scenario-based training session should be a standard part of a neonatal transport team 
evaluation process. At the end of the training program, only candidates successfully completing 
the pre-determined set of written and simulation-based objectives, should be considered for the  
transport team.  The training program should be developed by a small group of neonatal transport 
experts, education specialists, and simulation specialists.  The training program should be 
evaluated on an annual basis and modified as needed. 
 Efforts should be made to minimize transport team member turnover as much as 
possible.  As Salas, et al demonstrated in his 2008 meta-analysis, research indicates that team 
membership stability improved the relationship between team training and team outcomes, such  
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that intact teams that underwent training improved the most on process and performance 
outcomes.  The authors suggest that intact teams have already overcome some of the  
maturational challenges that newly formed teams would not have had the opportunity to navigate 
(Salas, 2008). 
 The public relations role of the neonatal transport team should also be incorporated in the 
transport team training process. The transport team is a frontline service provider.  The receiving 
hospital’s reputation is on the line every time a neonatal transport team is deployed. The 
performance of the team reflects the receiving hospital’s commitment to overall quality of 
patient care. Well-orchestrated, professional neonatal transport teams reflect the receiving 
hospital’s commitment to excellence in safety and patient care quality.  
QUALITY INITIATIVES 
Quality improvement initiatives involve all aspects of the neonatal transport program.  
“Consumers and the health care industry mandate adherence to particular standards during the  
provision of patient care.  Transport programs should analyze every component of the services 
provided to ensure effective, consistent, safe, and state-of-the-art care” (Woodward, 2007, p. 
134). 
The quality improvement process should be integrated into every level of the neonatal 
transport program. Essential components of the quality improvement program include: 1) a focus 
on the neonatal patient and family, 2) collaborative efforts for the purpose of improving 
processes and outcomes of neonatal transports, 3) strong leadership at all levels, 4) strategic 
planning goals, education and training program, and program development, 5) Data and 
information that are reliable, rapidly accessible, standardized, and timely 6) neonatal clinical  
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guidelines and performance measures, 7) commitment to research that contributes evidence for 
change in practice (Woodward, 2007). 
 Specific objectives of a neonatal transport team quality improvement initiative (QI) 
include: 1) identify important characteristics of neonatal transport, 2) Develop and maintain 
multidisciplinary communication links through the QI process, and provide a forum to present 
needs and areas for improvement via regularly scheduled meetings, 3) Establish regular review 
of patient care guidelines and how they are applied to predetermined indicators and other criteria 
to permit objective monitoring of the key aspects of care, 4) respond in a systematic manner to 
sentinel, serious, adverse, and near-miss events.  Expectations under JCAHO standards for an  
organization’s response to a sentinel event includes a root cause analysis and an action plan 
(Woodward, 2007). 
    DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION 
 “The culture of medicine attributes errors to carelessness or incompetence.  Liability 
concerns discourage the surfacing of errors and communication about how to correct them. The 
lack of explicit and consistent standards for patient safety creates gaps in licensing and  
accreditation and allows health care organizations to function without some of the basic safety 
systems in place. The lack of any agency or organization with primary responsibility for patient 
safety prevents the dissemination of any cohesive message about patient safety” (IOM, 2000, pp 
21-22). 
 “Benchmarking is the process of comparing one’s performance with that of others and 
begins with standardized, comparative measurements and then examines performance 
differences between similar processes. When applied to transport, benchmarking is the process of 
setting operating goals by selecting the top performers within the transport industry and  
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identifying best practices for the performance of the transport service” (Woodward, 2007, p. 
134). 
 The Institute of Medicine, CAMTS and the AAP all stress the value of data collection for 
the purpose of tracking, measuring, evaluating, and applying lessons learned to improve overall 
quality of health care. Unfortunately, no organized national data collection process exists for 
tracking safety and efficacy of neonatal transports. Without a national neonatal transport 
database, teams are unable to effectively evaluate the safety and effectiveness of their 
performance or compare it to other transport teams around the country. 
 The American Academy of Pediatrics, Section on Transport Medicine, has certain criterion 
they suggest are monitored regularly.  These include call time, departure time, response time, 
referring hospital, receiving hospital, presence of the referral MD at the referral hospital, 
demographics, data of birth, birth weight/transport weight and primary diagnosis and outcome. 
Also included are any unexpected events such as: extubation, hypothermia, hypoglycemia, 
hypoxia, hypotension, resuscitation efforts, and equipment failure. (Woodward, 2007).  
A national database for collecting/analyzing neonatal transport data is needed in order to 
systematically improve the overall quality of care and safety of transported neonatal patients. 
CONCLUSION 
 Inter-facility neonatal transports are inherently risky for both the patient as well as 
members of the medical transport team.  In order to minimize risks, efforts should be made to 
minimize the need for neonatal transports.  When possible, high-risk infants should be delivered 
at tertiary care centers with neonatal intensive care units.   When high-risk infants must be 
transported, care must be taken to minimize risks to the neonate and the medical team.   
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 Hospitals, committed to providing neonatal transport services to their referral hospitals 
should be philosophically and financially prepared to support a dedicated, professional neonatal 
transport team. The primary consideration when configuring a neonatal transport team must be 
the safety of the neonatal patient and the members of the transporting team. Neonatal transport 
teams should be carefully designed and developed, incorporating evidence-based team training 
strategies.  Crew Resource Management principles should be applied and simulation training  
should be incorporated into the training program.  On-going quality improvement initiatives 
should be incorporated into the program.  A national data registry needs to be created for the 
purpose of evaluating quality and safety aspects of neonatal transport team programs around the 
country. The American Academy of Pediatrics should be encouraged to publish a consensus 
statement regarding neonatal transport team safety, team configuration standards, transport 
equipment standards, and performance standards.  
 With the current financial crisis of the health care industry, hospital administrators are 
constantly forced to make difficult decisions.  However, with regard to neonatal transport teams, 
only two acceptable options exist:  1) support a professional, dedicated neonatal transport team,  
or 2) contract with another health care institution, capable of providing a safe neonatal transport 
team.  The gold-standard question any health care administrator should ask themselves when 
faced with the temptation to endorse a suboptimal neonatal transport program is “Is this transport 
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